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Crime and "Regulation": United States v. Salerno
Defendants Salerno and Cafaro were indicted for violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, mail and wire
fraud, extortion, and gambling offenses. At arraignment, the government
moved for pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984.1 The
government argued that, because the defendants were the leaders of the
Genovese organized crime family, no condition or combination of con2
ditions of pretrial release would assure the safety of the community.
The motion was granted, 3 and the defendants appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the detention
order, 4 holding that pretrial detention for the purpose of preventing
future crimes violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment.,
The government applied for a writ of certiorari. After the writ was
granted, Salerno was convicted and sentenced to 100 years imprisonment
in an unrelated proceeding, and Cafaro was released from detention for
6
health reasons after posting a $1,000,000 personal appearance bond.
The United States Supreme Court, after deciding that a valid controversy
still existed, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the detention
order. The Supreme Court held that the Bail Reform Act's authorization
of pretrial preventive detention on the ground of future dangerousness
was not facially unconstitutional as violative of the fifth amendment's
due process clause or the eighth amendment's prohibition of excessive
bail. 7 United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
The Court limited its holding to the "facial constitutionality" of
the statute. It expressly declined to consider the application of the statute
to the facts of the case, as that issue had not been raised by the
defendants. 8 Likewise, the Court did not express any views on provisions
of the statute not implicated by this case. 9 Nevertheless, the decision

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (Supp. III 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150
(West Supp. 1987).
2. In support of this argument, the government proffered the testimony of two
witnesses and excerpts from electronic surveillance, which showed murder conspiracies and
labor, loansharking, and gambling violence. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364,
1367-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
3. Id. at 1375.
4. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095
(1987).
5. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ..
" U.S. Const. amend. V.
6. 107 S. Ct. at 2106-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. U.S. Const. amends. V, VIII.
8. 107 S. Ct. at 2100 n.3.
9. Id.
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has serious implications. The Court held that, given certain procedural
safeguards, a competent adult citizen may be jailed based upon an
indictment and a showing that he poses a danger to the community,
even though he has not been convicted of any crime. The Court reached
this conclusion by finding that the detention is a permissible regulatory
measure, as opposed to an impermissible imposition of punishment. Six
members of the Court so voted, despite a serious question of mootness.
This note will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Salerno and
its ramifications. It will first consider the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and
the resultant changes in federal bail practice. It will then analyze the
opinion in Salerno and the earlier decisions upon which the Court based
its holding. Following a critique of the majority's decision, the note
will conclude by examining the impact of Salerno on federal bail practice
and constitutional litigation.
THE

1984

ACT AND FEDERAL BAIL PRACTICE

Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789,10 the federal bail
law has served primarily to ensure the appearance of the defendant at
trial." Any danger posed to witnesses by the defendant was a secondary
consideration. Generally, if a defendant in a non-capital case was likely
to appear for trial, he was admitted to bail.' 2 The exclusive use of
money bail discriminated against poor defendants. Although otherwise
qualified for pretrial release, these defendants would be detained merely
because they lacked sufficient resources to post bail. In 1966, Congress
amended the bail law to de-emphasize the use of money bail and increase
the use of release on recognizance. 3 This led to more defendants being
4
released before trial.'
With the increase in pretrial release came an increase in crimes
committed by released defendants."' Studies indicated rearrest rates ranging from less than one to approximately sixteen percent.' 6 This led to

10.
11.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789).
Ervin, Preventive Detention, A Species of Lydford Law, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

113 (1983).
12. Id. at 120-21.
13. Id. at 113-14.
14. Bail Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 1098, H.R. 3005, and H.R. 3491 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 109 (1983) [hereinafter Bail Reform
Hearings] (testimony of Malcolm M. Feeley, Professor, University of Wisconsin).
15. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3188.
16. Bail Reform Hearings, supra note 14, at 238 (testimony of Ira Glasser, Executive
Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
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criticism of the bail law as being too liberal insofar as it did not allow

a judge to consider
the safety of the community when deciding on
7
pretrial release.'

In response to this criticism, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.' 8 Under this statute, a court must consider not only the risk
of flight and the danger to witnesses, but also the safety of the community, when setting conditions of pretrial release. The Act retains the
earlier law's prohibition of economic discrimination, stating that "[t]he
judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the
pretrial detention of the person." 1 9
The Act requires that upon the defendant's initial appearance before
a judicial officer, the officer shall issue an order that the defendant
either be released on recognizance, released subject to conditions, or
detained. 20 On motion by the attorney for the government, the court
shall hold a detention hearing in a case that involves a crime of violence,
a capital offense, a drug offense carrying a maximum sentence of ten
years or more, or any felony where the accused has been convicted of
two or more of the offenses described above. 21 The court may also hold
a detention hearing on its own motion if it finds there is a serious risk
22
of flight or obstruction of justice.
In certain situations, a rebuttable presumption arises that no conditions of release will assure the safety of the community. The presumption is invoked if the defendant has been convicted of one of the
crimes listed above, the crime occurred while he was on pretrial release,
and either the conviction or the release from imprisonment for the
conviction occurred within five years of the hearing. The presumption
also arises if the defendant is accused of a drug offense which carries
2
a maximum penalty of ten years or more. 1

At the detention hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel.
He may testify and present witnesses, cross-examine the government's

17. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3187-88.
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (Supp. IIi 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150
(West Supp. 1987).
19. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
20. Id. § 3141(a).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (SUpp. II 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f)(1)
(West Supp. 1987).
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (0(2) (West Supp. 1987). If a detention hearing is to be
held, either the government or the defendant may move for a continuance. The continuance
may be of up to five days if sought by the defendant, or up to three days if sought by
the government. See id. § 3142(f).
23. Id. § 3142(e).
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witnesses, and present evidence by proffer. The rules concerning the
24

admissibility of evidence do not apply.
If the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that
no condition or combination of conditions of release will assure the
safety of the community, he shall order the defendant detained pending

trial. 25 The judge must issue written reasons for his finding,26 and the

27
accused has the right to an expedited appeal.
This statute is based in part on the District of Columbia's preventive
detention statute, 28 which Congress passed in 1970. A significant difference between the two is that the federal statute has no limitation on
the length of time a defendant may be detained. 29 The legislative history
shows that Congress intended that the length of detention be controlled
by existing provisions,30 specifically the Speedy Trial Act.3' Although
this ostensibly limits the detention to seventy days,32 the exceptions
contained in the Speedy Trial Act may allow detention for well over a
year.33
The denial of bail on the grounds of future dangerousness substantially departs from traditional federal bail practice. Congress heard
testimony that judges considered dangerousness when setting bail in the
past," ' and that they practiced preventive detention by setting bail at high
amounts.35 The explicit authorization of preventive detention, however,
has sparked widespread debate on its constitutionality. 6 Despite this
debate, the federal circuits which addressed the issue had uniformly

24. Id.§ 3142(0.
25. Id.§§ 3142(e), 3142(0.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) (Supp. III 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1342(i) (West
Supp. 1987).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3145.
28. D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
29. The District of Columbia provision limits detention to ninety days. See D.C.
Code Ann. § 23-1322(d)(4) (Supp. 1987).
30. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 22 n.63, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3205 n. 63.
31. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982).
33. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 510, 515-16 (1986).
34. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 10-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3191-93.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 11; Alschuler, supra note 33; Schlesinger, Bail Reform:
Protecting the Community and the Accused, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 173 (1986); Berg,
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 Emory L.J. 685 (1985); Note, The Loss of Innocence:
Preventive Detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 805
(1985); Note, Preventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent,
32 Am. U.L. Rev. 191 (1982).
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upheld the statute prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Salerno."
The Supreme Court did not choose to face the issue until the statute
was declared unconstitutional.
THE MAJORITY'S DECISION IN Salerno

The majority began by dismissing the claim that pretrial detention
based on dangerousness was punishment before trial in violation of due
process. It reasoned that the fact of detention alone does not mean that
one is being punished; rather, one must distinguish between "impermissible punishment" and "permissible regulation." 3
It is axiomatic that the imposition of punishment for a crime requires
conviction. The government controls behavior in other ways, however,
which fall short of being "punishment." The Supreme Court thus developed a distinction between "punishment," which may not be imposed
without a prior conviction, and "regulation," which requires only that
the person receive due process.3 9 The Court has used this distinction in
cases involving the loss of citizenship, 4° deportation and detention of
aliens, 4' and alleged bills of attainder.4 2 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,43 Justice Goldberg summarized the tests used to determine a sanction's true nature:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional
intent as to the penal nature of a statute, these factors must
be considered in relation to the statute on its face."

37. See United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Perry,
788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); United States v. Zannino,
798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102 (lth Cir. 1986).
38. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987).
39. See generally Note, Punishment, Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power
and Substantive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez, and
Speiser Cases, 34 Ind. L.J. 231, 232 (1959).
40. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958).
41. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896).
42. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073 (1946).
43. 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).
44. Id. at 168-69, 83 S. Ct. at 567-68 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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In that case, the majority concluded that the loss of citizenship for
45
draft evasion was punishment, and thus required a conviction.
In the past, the Court used this distinction to strike down governmental actions which effectively punished without a conviction. In a
recent series of cases, however, the Court has used it to uphold governmental actions as regulatory, even if the acts occurred in the context
46
of a criminal proceeding. The first of these cases was Bell v. Wolfish.
The pretrial detainee plaintiffs in Bell sought to enjoin certain practices of the detaining authorities on the grounds that the practices violated
due process. These practices included assigning two persons to oneperson rooms, banning the receipt of books or magazines except from
publishers or bookstores, banning the receipt of food and personal
property from outside the facility, random searches of the detainees'
living areas, and searches of the detainees' body cavities.4 7 Writing for
the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that the proper inquiry was whether
these practices constituted punishment, and concluded that the practices
were permissible regulation. Because the officials had no intent to punish,
the procedures were required only to be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental concern. Since those practices related to the government's
concern over security at the detention facility, they did not violate due
4
process. 1
The importance of a relationship between the restriction and a
49
legitimate government objective was reinforced in Schall v. Martin.
Schall dealt with the preventive detention of juveniles by a state pending
a delinquency hearing. Once again, Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion. Addressing the due process question raised by the plaintiffs,
the court said that the first consideration must be whether the detention
served a legitimate state objective. It found this legitimate objective in
the combination of the state's interest in preventing crime and its interest
in acting in parens patriae to preserve the welfare of the child. The
Court noted that the detention was "consistent with the regulatory and
parens patriaeobjectives relied upon by the State."5 0 Reasoning that a
juvenile who is constantly subject to control by adults has a lesser liberty
interest than an adult, the Court concluded that the government's interests
outweighed those of the juvenile, and due process was not violated. 5'

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 165-66, 83 S. Ct. at 566.
441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
The detainees did not challenge the constitutionality of their detention. See infra

text accompanying notes 80-81.

48. 441 U.S. at 561-62, 99 S. Ct. at 1886.
49. 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).

50. Id.at 271, 104 S.Ct. at 2413.
51.

Id.at 265, 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
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Because there was a legitimate state objective, and there was no express
intent to impose punishment, the detention was found to be regulatory
and upheld.52
In Salerno, the Court used the rational relation test formulated in
Bell and Schall, saying that "[t]o determine whether a restriction or
liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation,
we first look to legislative intent." 53 This initial inquiry into legislative
intent effectively determined the issue. In the absence of an express
intent to punish, a mere rational relationship with a legitimate state
objective is sufficient to establish that the action is regulatory. The Court
thus used the fact that the restriction on liberty would be permissible
4
under a regulatory analysis to establish the applicability of that analysis.1
The Court in Salerno found no express intent to punish, and concluded
that Congress had formulated pretrial preventive detention as a potential
solution to the "pressing societal problem" of crime committed by
persons released on bail. 5
Having found a regulatory purpose, the Court then addressed the
issue of whether the means used to achieve the purpose were excessive.
It found that they were not. Congress had carefully limited the cases
in which detention could be sought and had provided for a prompt
hearing. The Court said that the length of the detention was limited by
the "stringent time limitations" of the Speedy Trial Act. Since there
was an intent to regulate, and the conditions were not excessive, the
Court found that pretrial preventive detention did not constitute im56
permissible punishment.
After deciding that the detention in Salerno was regulatory, the
Court still had to determine whether it violated due process. The majority
chose to use an interest-balancing due process test. Since the Court was
not considering the application of the statute to the facts of Salerno's
case 7 it looked to prior jurisprudence to determine if there were any
circumstances which would justify the detention of individuals prior to
trial on the grounds of dangerousness.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the
Court had "repeatedly held that the government's interest in community
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 281, 104 S. Ct. at 2419.
107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987).
See infra text accompanying notes 93 & 94.
107 S. Ct. at 2101.
Id at 2102.
Id. at 2100 n.3.
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interest.""8 He cited cases which purportedly upheld the detention of
individuals without a prior conviction.
Ludecke v. Watkins59 and Moyer v. Peabody0 were cited for the
proposition that, in times of war or insurrection, persons deemed "dangerous" could be detained by the executive .6 1 These cases both arose in
extraordinary circumstances. Ludecke dealt with the detention of enemy
aliens during World War II; Moyer concerned the detention of a leader
of an insurrection in Colorado. In Moyer, however, Justice Holmes
provided an ample distinction for these two cases, saying, "When it
comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving
its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems
'62
the necessities of the moment."
Chief Justice Rehnquist next wrote, "[W]e have found no absolute
constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings," 63 mentioning Carlson v. Landon6 and
Wong Wing v. United States.65 In Wong Wing it was held that aliens
could not be imprisoned for a year prior to deportation; in dicta, the
Court said that temporary confinement pending the deportation would
be valid "as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions
for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens . . . . "6 Distinguishing deportation proceedings from criminal cases, the Court in Carlson held that
the denial of bail to alien communists pending a deportation hearing
was justified as an exercise of Congress's sovereign power to determine
67
which aliens may remain in the United States.
Citing Addington v. Texas, 61 the Salerno Court next said "[T]he government may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a danger
to the public." ' 69 In Addington, the Court addressed the issue of the
standard of proof required for an involuntary commitment, holding that
only clear and convincing proof of mental illness and dangerous tendencies was required for the commitment. The Court noted that the
power to commit arose from a combination of the parens patriae interest

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
(1979).

Id.
335
212
107
212
107
342
163
Id.
342
441
107

at 2102.
U.S. 160, 68 S. Ct. 1429 (1948).
U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 235 (1909).
S. Ct. at 2102.
U.S. at 85, 29 S. Ct. at 237 (emphasis added).
S. Ct. at 2102.
U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952).
U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896).
at 235, 16 S. Ct. at 980.
U.S. at 544-45, 72 S. Ct. at 536.
U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
S. Ct. at 2102, citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804
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in caring for the incompetent and the general police power to protect
70
the community.
The majority then stated that the government may detain dangerous
defendants who become incompetent to stand trial. In Greenwood v.
United States,7' the petitioner challenged the power of the federal government to commit a defendant who was found to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. Such commitment was held valid as a necessary
adjunct to the power to prosecute federal crimes.7 2 In Jackson v. Indiana7 the Court struck down the commitment of a defendant which
was based upon less stringent standards than those required for a civil
commitment. Noting that the Court had previously held that equal
protection required affording convicts the same safeguards as any other
citizens in commitment cases, 74 the Court in Jackson stated, "If criminal
conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less
procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than
that generally available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges
' 75
surely cannot suffice."
Schall v. Martin76 was cited as authorizing the preventive detention
of juveniles. As in Addington, however, this was justified by a combination of the police power and the state's parens patriae interest in
77
the detainee's welfare.
The majority said that the police may hold a person until a neutral
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists. The Court in Gerstein v. Pugh" held that the fourth amendment requires a timely determination of probable cause by the magistrate; the detention involved
79
was merely an administrative adjunct to arrest.
Finally, the Court mentioned that an arrestee may be incarcerated
until trial if he presents a risk of flight, citing Bell v. Wolfish. 80 The
plaintiffs in Bell were challenging only the conditions of their confinement, not the confinement itself. In the Bell opinion, Justice Rehnquist

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
S. Ct.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id at 426, 99 S. Ct. at 1809.
350 U.S. 366, 76 S. Ct. 410 (1956).
Id. at 375, 76 S. Ct. at 415.
406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972).
Id. at 723-24, 92 S. Ct. at 1851, citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86
760 (1966).
406 U.S. at 724, 92 S. Ct. at 1851 (emphasis added).
467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).
Id. at 264-66, 104 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
Id.at 126, 95 S. Ct. at 869.
441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
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emphasized at several points that the detention was not an issue and
that its constitutionality was not being decided.',
After citing these decisions, the Court conceded a 'general rule'
of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person
prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial. ' 8 2 The ultimate determination of constitutionality, however, depended upon a weighing of
the particular governmental interest with that of the individual. Since
Congress had determined that the individuals affected by the statute
(those arrested for serious crimes) were highly likely to be responsible
for dangerous acts, the Court said that "society's interest in crime
prevention is at its greatest." 83 On the other side of the scale, the
individual has a "strong interest in liberty." The Court stated:
We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of
this right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances
where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society .... Under these
circumstances, we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
4
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
The Court then addressed the claim that preventive detention violated
procedural due process. Deciding that the procedures utilized were adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some defendants,
the Court noted that the procedures of the Act were designed to ensure
an accurate determination of the danger posed by the defendant. It cited
the protections afforded the defendant, including the right to counsel,
the right to testify and present witnesses, and the right to cross-examine
witnesses presented by the government. It further noted that the judicial
officer must base his decision on certain statutory factors, and that the
government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Finally,
the judicial officer must provide written reasons for his detention decision, and the defendant has the right to an immediate appeal. The
Court decided that these procedures "suffice[d] to repel a facial challenge. "83
Having disposed of the due process claims, the Court turned to the
defendants' eighth amendment challenge. Noting that the amendment
states merely that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required," the majority
concluded that the amendment said nothing about whether bail shall be

81. Id.at 523, 533-34 n.15, 99 S. Ct. at 1865-66, 1871 n.15.
82. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102 (1987).
83. Id.at 2103.
84. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332
(1934)).
85. 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
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available at all.8 6 The Court questioned whether the amendment imposes
any limitations on Congress's power to define those classes of criminal
cases which shall be bailable. It declined to decide this issue, however,
saying, "[Elven if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
imposes some substantive limitations on the National Legislature's powers
in this area, we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid."",
The Court reached this conclusion by rejecting the defendants' contention that the amendment allows only risk of flight to be considered
as a basis for denying pretrial release. The Court distinguished earlier
statements to that effect, stating that earlier bail laws had only advanced
the government's interests in seeing that the defendant appeared at trial
and did not threaten witnesses. In contrast, the present law also advances
the governmental interest in protecting society. The majority concluded
that to determine whether conditions of bail are "excessive" under the
eighth amendment,
we must compare that response against the interest the government seeks to protect by means of that response ....
We
believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis
of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it
has here, the Eighth Amendment does riot require release on
bail.88
CRITIQUE

Justice Marshall dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan.
Initially, he criticized the majority's assumption of jurisdiction. Noting
that Salerno had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in an
unrelated proceeding, and that Cafaro was currently on release under
a $1,000,000 appearance bond, Justice Marshall argued that no eontroversy existed as to their pretrial detentionA He then attacked the basis
of the majority's decision, saying, "The majority proceeds as though
the only substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause is the
right to be free from punishment before conviction." 9 He argued that
the effect of the Bail Reform Act is to transform the indictment into
evidence against the accused. He concluded that this eviscerates the
91
presumption of innocence, and is thus unconstitutional.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2105.
2106-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2108.
2109-11.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Justice Stevens also dissented. He agreed with Justice Marshall's
conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional. While he did not think
that preventive detention would be unconstitutional in all cases, he said
that the mere fact of indictment could not be given weight in reaching
the decision.92
The distinction between regulation and punishment developed as a
method of determining which governmental actions require the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant. 93 The test conceived
by the Court in Bell and applied in Salerno, however, fails to make
this distinction. Under this test, the first inquiry is whether there is an
express intent to punish. If so, the test is superfluous. If not, the court
must then determine if "the alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." 94 Ifthis test
is met, the action is pronounced regulatory and upheld. If this test is
not met, then the action is invalid even when considered as a regulatory
measure. Thus, in the absence of an express intent to punish, a defendant
seeking to invoke the greater protections against punishment must first
show that the sanction violates the lesser protections against regulation.
The test is thus no test at all; the sole determinative factor is the
intent of Congress. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
has transformed the distinction between regulation and punishment into
a mere euphemistic device. In Salerno, the Court failed to recognize
the fact that, whether one is being "regulated" or "punished," jail is
jail. The distinction lives on, however, because "regulating the dangerous" is more palatable than "imprisoning the presumably innocent."
The use of the distinction enabled the Court to engage in an interestbalancing due process test. Unlike the "fundamental concepts of liberty"
test used in cases such as Palko v. Connecticut,95 under this balancing
test any individual right can be outweighed by a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest. 96 The compelling interest in Salerno was the federal
government's interest in preventing crime and protecting the community.

92. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
93. See Note, supra note 39, at 232.
94. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874 (1979), citing Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567-68 (1963) (citations omitted;
clarification in original).
95. 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937); but see Boston v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1969) (overruling Palko).
96. For a discussion and criticism of the interest-balancing due process test, particularly
as applied to preventive detention, see Alschuler, supra note 33, at 520-27, 532-36 (arguing
that the interest-balancing test is flawed because it allows governmental action which
should be struck down and overturns governmental action which should be upheld).

19881

NOTES

Examining the cases cited by the Court, it is apparent that this
interest alone has never been held sufficient to justify detention, even
when invoked by the states under their plenary police power. Rather,
detention was upheld only when practiced pursuant to the war powers
clause 9 7 the power of a state to put down rebellion," the sovereign
power to regulate immigration, 9 a combination of the police power and
a parens patriae interest, '1 or as an administrative step incident to
arrest. l01 Even if Bell v. Wolfish °2 were read to authorize detention, as
the Court suggests, the governmental interest in that case was assuring
the appearance of the defendants at trial. 03 This, of course, is the classic
purpose of the law of bail, to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.
Salerno is thus unique in authorizing preventive detention based solely
on the federal government's interest in preventing the commission of
4
crimes in the future.'1
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Court's action in Salerno
is the eagerness of the Court to uphold the detention. Twenty-eight days
prior to the grant of certiorari in Salerno, the Court denied the application in a similar case in which the Third Circuit had upheld the

constitutionality of the Act. 05 It then decided the issue in Salerno, a
case which presented neither a fact situation to consider nor a live

controversy.' °6 The Court obviously wanted to make a statement about
the Act, yet its ultimate holding is narrow. The Court reserved judgment
on the application of the Act to particular fact situations, and declined
to consider any part of the Act not implicated in Salerno's case. 0 7 In
its haste to uphold the Act's facial validity, the Court may have raised
more questions than it answered.

97. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 68 S. Ct. 1429 (1948).
98. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 235 (1909).
99. Carlson v. Landon, 342, U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896).
100. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
101. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
102. 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
103. Id.at 534 n.15, 99 S. Ct. at 1871 n.15.
104. As noted by Justice Marshall, Salerno also raises a substantial question of the
extent of the federal government's powers in relation to the states, a question ignored
by the majority. See 107 S. Ct. at 2108 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Certiorari was denied in United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986), on October 6, 1986. Certiorari was granted in Salerno,
107 S. Ct. 397 (1986), on November 3, 1986.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 89. Justice Marshall's complete discussion

of the procedural posture of the case is found in his dissenting opinion, 107 S. Ct. at
2106-07.
107.

107 S. Ct. at 2100 n.3.
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The Court, in upholding the preventive detention provisions of the
Bail Reform Act, justified its conclusions with a litany of the procedural
protections afforded potential detainees. Since the Court did decide that
pretrial preventive detention is not facially unconstitutional, the question
now becomes which of the protections cited are constitutionally compelled? The answer to this question will determine the10 8 future of preventive detention on both the state and federal levels.
QUESTIONs LEFT

OPEN

Salerno is important as the first United States Supreme Court de-

cision authorizing the use of pretrial preventive detention. One commentator has predicted an increased use of existing preventive detention
measures by both state and federal prosecutors; 1°9 another has suggested
that the decision will lead to increased pressure on states without such
measures to adopt preventive detention statutes of their own."' , Those
who hail the decision as a blanket authorization of preventive detention,
however, will find themselves mistaken.
Salerno establishes the method of analysis of future preventive detention cases. Because the detention is regulatory, the government's
interests in each particular case must be weighed against those of the
particular defendant, and the defendant must receive at least some of
the procedural protections cited by the Court. Future litigation will be
necessary to determine the validity of the remainder of the Bail Reform
Act.
One of the questions left unanswered is exactly what constitutes a
threat to the "safety of the community.""' This would not have been
a likely issue in Salerno even if the character of the defendants had
been under consideration. The government proffered evidence that Salerno and Cafaro were Mafia chieftains, and the prosecution had tapes of
them ordering executions." 2 The statutory language, however, offers little
guidance, and, as the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the bill
stated, "The Committee intends that the concern about safety be given

108. The states, of course, remain free to provide greater protection to criminal
defendants. See, e.g., La. Const. art. I, § 18 ("[A] person shall be bailable by sufficient
surety, except when he is-charged with a capital offense and the proof is evident and
the presumption of guilt is great.")
109. Stewart, Pretrial Detentions Upheld, 73 A.B.A. J. 54, 58 (Aug. 1, 1987).
110. States Likely to Look Anew at Pretrial Detention, 9 Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1987,
at 5, col. 1.
111. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West Supp. 1987).
112. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1367-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated,
794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
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a broader construction than merely danger of harm involving physical
violence.""' 3 This interpretation has been repeated by some of the lower
courts." 4 The Court in Salerno, however, characterizes the governmental
interest as "overwhelming,""' and relies upon prior cases which involved
dangers on the scale of threats to the very existence of a state."16 This
supports a narrower interpretation of the statute, which would encompass
only the gravest dangers to the community. Such a reading of the statute
is also supported by the Senate Committee's statement that detention
is meant to be applied only to a small, identifiable class of arrestees."17
Another problem with the Act is the presumption of dangerousness
which arises in certain situations." 8 The lower courts have interpreted
this presumption as shifting only the burden of production, rather than
the burden of persuasion, to the defendant."19 Nevertheless, this presumption is at odds with the presumption of innocence. Although the
Supreme Court has said that "the presumption of innocence is a doctrine
that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials ....
[and] it
has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun,"' 20 that statement
arose in the context of detainees seeking to use the presumption to
challenge the conditions of their confinement and not the confinement
itself. In contrast, the situation of a defendant seeking to determine
whether he will be detained at all is more analogous to a trial, where
the government bears the burden of proof in an adversary proceeding.
The decision in Salerno is predicated on an assumption that the government has met its burden of proving dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence; this proof is what gives rise to the compelling
governmental interest.' 2' After showing that the defendant is likely to
commit a serious crime, the government has an interest in preventing
that crime.
On the other hand, if the finding of dangerousness comes solely
from a congressional decision that those accused of certain crimes, or

113. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3195.
114. United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501 (D.C.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 755
F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85 (M.D.Pa. 1985).
115. 107 S. Ct. at 2103.
116. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 235 (1909).
117. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3192-93.
118. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West Supp. 1987).
119. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Medina,
775 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1985).
120. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1870-71 (1979).
121. 107 S. Ct. at 2103.
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those arrestees who possess certain characteristics, are more likely to
commit crimes while released, the government's interest is less compelling. If the government is unable to show that a particular defendant
is likely to commit such a crime, that defendant should not be detained.
The fact that a person has been convicted of a crime at some point in
the past, or has been accused of a particular crime, should not result
in that person having fewer procedural protections than other defendants.
This presumption violates both due process and equal protection; 122 any
detention based solely on the presumption should be overruled.
A final problem with the Act is its failure to set a time limit on
the detention. The Court in Salerno noted the congressional reliance on
the Speedy Trial Act, and implicitly held this sufficient to meet the test
of facial constitutionality. 123 Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that
at some point regulatory detention may become punitive, though it
declined to indicate when this might occur. 24 In a pre-Salerno decision,
the Second Circuit decided that detention of over eight months on the
sole ground of dangerousness violated due process as constituting impermissible punishment. 25 A solution to this problem would be to interpret the congressional citation of the Speedy Trial Act as a justification
for using that Act's nominal seventy day time limit 26 as the outer
boundary for regulatory detention. 27 This would provide a bright-line
rule which has some support in the legislative history. 2 It would avoid
the problem of a dangerous defendant, accused of a relatively minor
"crime of violence," being detained for a longer period than he would
be sentenced to upon conviction. This time limit would restrict the use
of preventive detention to those cases in which the guilt of the defendant
can be readily proved.
Salerno will also have consequences for the various state preventive
detention schemes.' 29 These vary widely in the procedures used. The

122. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972) (striking down
on equal protection grounds a civil commitment of an accused which was based on a
lesser standard of proof than that required in normal proceedings).
123. 107 S.Ct. at 2101.
124. Id. at 2101 n.4.
125. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107
S. Ct. 562 (1986).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982).
127. For an example of the Court borrowing time limits from one statute to fill a
gap in another, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987)
(borrowing the Clayton Act's statute of limitations for use in civil RICO actions).
128. Bail Reform Hearings, supra note 14, at 148 (statement of the Honorable John
D. Butzner, Jr., Chairman, Committee of Administration of the Criminal Law of the
Judicial Conference of the United States).
129. For an analysis of the various state provisions, see B. Gottlieb, Public Danger

1988]

NOTES

federal Act now provides a benchmark against which these statutes can
be measured, but the Court's decision offers little guidance as to which
of the measures will survive. All that can be said is that those statutes
which provide at least as much protection to the defendant as the federal
Act are likely to be upheld. Whether those with less protection will be
sustained is a matter of conjecture.
Finally, the Court leaves open several questions about the impact
and operation of the eighth amendment. The Court suggests that it may
not even limit the power of Congress to define those crimes which may
be bailable. If this is the case, Congress would theoretically be able to
eliminate bail altogether. A lower court has held that the eighth amendment requires individual determinations with respect to bail decisions;'30
this is at odds with the suggestion in Salerno. The only thing that is
certain about the eighth amendment after Salerno is that it does not
constitute a right to bail.
CONCLUSION

Salerno is important in the area of individual rights as a bellwether
of the Rehnquist Court's attitudes. The decision evinces the judicial
restraint one would expect from a conservative Court in its deference
to the decisions of a coordinate branch of government. This respect
extends to the point of adopting Congress's suggested method of
analysis. 3'
On the other hand, the Court's rush to decide this obviously moot
case shows an activist desire to uphold governmental action wherever
it may be questioned. These conflicting tendencies will probably continue
to manifest themselves as the majority attempts to delineate the extent
of governmental power, particularly in the area of criminal law and
procedure.
The decision also signals the continuing approval of interest-balancing in due process adjudication.'3 2 As discussed above, this test leads

as a Factor in Pretrial Release: A Comparative Analysis of State Laws (1985). The
adoption of preventive detention in Louisiana would require a constitutional amendment,
since La. Const. art. I, § 18 guarantees criminal defendants a right to bail in non-capital
cases.
130. Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), reversed on other grounds sub.
nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S. Ct. 1181 (1982).
131. The Senate Committee's report analyzed the proposed legislation in terms of the
regulatory-penal distinction, and concluded that the bill was regulatory and thus constitutional. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 15, at 7-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3182, 3190-91.
132. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 526 (because of the multitude of due process
formulas, the Court "has been able to select some formulas ... while silently disregarding
others").
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to the expansion of governmental power over the individual. Given the
composition of the Court, both now and in the foreseeable future, it
can be expected that well-recognized rights will continue to be protected,
but that there will be little or no new recognition of individual rights
implicit under the due process clause.
United States v. Salerno is a curious case which wraps a narrow
holding in ribbons of very broad language. Although it purports to
"solve" the problem of preventive detention, it actually raises more
questions than it answers. Given a properly narrow reading, it should
do little more than validate the practice of detaining dangerous arrestees.
It may be, however, the Supreme Court's final statement on the issue.
If that is the case, and courts in the future read Salerno in the broad
fashion suggested by the decision itself, then Justice Marshall's evocation
of a police state' may not be far from the mark.
Donald W. Price

133. Throughout the world today there are men, women, and children interred
indefinitely, awaiting trials while may never come or which may be a mockery
of the word, because their governments believe them to be 'dangerous'. Our
Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago, can shelter us forever
from the evils of such unchecked power ....
But it cannot protect us if we lack
the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves.
107 S. Ct. at 2112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

